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Phenomenological Objectivity and Moral Theory
Abstract
The relation between moral phenomenology and moral theory is dealt with. The aims in the 
paper involve the following: clarifying the notion of moral phenomenology, especially the 
impact that it has on moral theory; interpreting the discussion between moral cognitivism 
and non-cognitivism in the light of moral phenomenology; presenting the most recent posi­
tion of cognitive expressivism concerning this debate; pointing out the main shortcomings 
of this theory, especially in respect to the purported objectivity of moral judgements. Cogni­
tive expressivism still leaves a gap between the immediate features of our internal moral 
psychology and their theoretical explanation, thereby losing much of its apparent phenome­
nological support. A proper understanding of the purported phenomenological objectivity 




1. Moral phenomenology: 




companied	debates	 in	moral	 theory	 from	 the	very	beginning,	 although	not	
necessarily	 in	 an	 explicit	manner.	 The	 term	 “moral	 phenomenology”	may	















































































2. Moral phenomenology, 
  moral realism and cognitivism
In	what	follows	we	first	lay	out	phenomenological	aspects	of	moral	experi-
ence	underlying	the	often	made	claim	that	moral	phenomenology	supports	or	
favours	moral	 realism	and	cognitivism	(robustly realistic cognitivism)	over	
anti-realism	and	non-cognitivism.	We	focus	mostly,	but	not	exclusively	upon	






















tively	 cognizable	 aspects	 of	 our	 own	 moral	
experiences.	And	finally,	such	arguments	pre-
suppose	 that	 the	 employed	 aspects	 of	moral	




Such	 understanding	 of	 phenomenological	 ar-
gument	 is	 certainly	 very	 strong,	 but	 there	
are	 indications	 that	 certain	 authors	 would	
accept	 it.	Here	 is	 a	 quote	 from	Dancy,	who	
believes	 that	 phenomenological	 argument	 is	
the	only	direct	argument	one	can	offer	in	sup-
port	of	moral	realism.	“[W]e	take	moral	value	
to	be	part	 of	 the	 fabric	of	 the	world;	 taking	





as	 being,	 we	 should	 take	 it	 in	 the	 absence	
of	 contrary	 considerations	 that	 actions	 and	
agents	do	have	 the	sorts	of	moral	properties	
we	experience	 in	 them.	This	 is	an	argument	
about	 the	nature	of	moral	experience,	which	
moves	 from	 that	 nature	 to	 the	 probable	 na-
ture	 of	 the	 world”	 (Dancy	 1998:	 231–232).	
McNaughton	takes	a	similar	line:	“The	real-






methodological	point:	 there	 is	 a	presupposi-
tion	 that	 things	 are	 the	 way	 we	 experience	
















and	 characteristics	 of	 ordinary	 moral	 dis-
course	 and	 moral	 practice	 (Timmons	 1999:	
12).	What	we	need	 to	add	 is	 that	what-it-is-
like	 phenomenological	 aspects	 of	 our	moral	
experience	 are	 also	 part	 of	 ordinary	 moral	
discourse	and	moral	practice.
4
For	 a	 useful	 utilization	 of	 the	 plausibility	





types	 of	 moral	 experience	 (2008),	 partially	
based	 on	 the	 work	 of	 Mandelbaum	 (1955).	





e.g.	when	 one	 forms	 a	moral	 judgment	 that	
he/she	must	keep	a	promise	and	go	to	his/her	
friend’s	house	in	order	to	help	her	with	mov-
ing	 out.	 Of	 course	 one	 could	 also	 consider	







2.1. Moral phenomenology favouring moral 











































2.2. Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism debate 









directly	 support	 robustly	 realistic	 cognitivism,	while	 non-cognitivism	 tried	































are	 “motivationally	 hot”	 (Horgan	 and	 Tim-
mons	2006).	It	seems	like	no	desire	is	needed	













we	 cannot	 opt	 for	 indifference,	 ignorance,	
skepticism	or	ataraxia as	 a	way	of	 avoiding	
conflict.	Smith	(2003)	also	points	to	the	strong	
correlation	 between	 agent’s	 judgments	 about	
obligations	and	motivational	potential.
8
Mandelbaum	 characterizes	 this	 in	 the	 fol-






moral	 judgment	 are	 always	 experienced	 as	





keep	 a	 promise	 this	 demand	 does	 not	 issue	
from	me,	but	is	levelled	against	me:	it	is	not	
that	 I	want	 to	 give	 five	 dollars	which	moti-
vated	me,	but	the	fact	that	I	feel	obligated	to	
keep	my	promise.	The	promise	itself	appears	














favours	 acceptance	 of	 moral	 objectivism	 of	
some	sort,	but	given	that	most	authors	(Man-





Blackburn	 feels	 the	 pull	 of	 the	 mentioned	
phenomenological	 aspects	 and	 says	 about	
defenders	 of	 cognitivism	 and	 realism	 that	
“[p]erhaps	 their	 weightiest	 point	 is	 that	 the	
















beliefs traditional cognitivism cognitivist expressivism (non-descriptive cognitivism)












like	desires”	(Harold,	 forthcoming),	since	 the	old	criteria,	 like	meaningful-
ness	 and	 truth-aptness,	 seem	 less	 plausible	with	 the	 appearance	of	 expres-
sivist/non-cognitivist	 positions	 (e.g.	Gibbard,	Blackburn)	which	 claim	 that	
moral	judgments	can	be	both	truth-apt	and	meaningful	in	some	sense.





3. Cognitivist expressivism and moral phenomenology
In	assessing	the	prospects	of	cognitive	expressivism	we	will	limit	ourselves	


































































ble,	 assertible,	 truth-apt	 content)	 is	 descrip-









ing	 under	 some	 category,	 where	 one’s	 clas-
sificatory	 coming	 down	 is	 experienced	 (3)	
as	involuntary,	(4)	as	a	cognitive	response	to	
some	sort	of	consideration	that	is	experienced	
(perhaps	 peripherally	 in	 consciousness)	 as	








of	moral	 judgments	 since	we	 find	 a	 similar	
distinction	there	between	the	attitude	and	the	


















3.2. CE and accommodation of moral judgments’ 














Leaving	other	 considerations	on	 the	 side	and	concentrating	merely	on	
phenomenology,	CE	seems	to	leave	a	great	part	of	belief-like	aspect	out	
of	the	picture,	namely	the	“subjective	feel	of	being	aware	of	a	proposi-
tion	and	presenting	 it	 to	oneself	as	 true	or	plausible”,	 truth-aptness	of	
beliefs	and	their	direction	of	fit.18	It	seems	that	beliefs	are	just	the	kind	




direction	 of	 fit	 for	 ought	 beliefs	 is	 a	 “world-to-mind”	 direction.	Note	
that	 according	 to	CE	 in	moral	 judgment	we	 are	ought-committed	 that	
















which	 they	 purport	 to	 offer	 an	 expressivist	 solution	 to	 that	 problem),	







good-commitments.	On	our	view,	then,	both	ought­claims and good­claims are expressions of 

























Again,	 we	 are	 limiting	 our	 use	 of	 the	 term	







experiences	 involving	 moral	 judgment;	 we	
will	argue	on	one	hand	that	this	phenomenol-
ogy	 supports	 the	 cognitivist	 contention	 that	
moral	judgments	are	genuine	beliefs,	and	on	








this,	 in	 part,	 by	 coming	 prepackaged	 with	
































3.3. CE and accommodation of objective aspects pertaining 
     to moral judgments’ phenomenology
Things	 are	 also	 interesting	 when	 we	 look	 at	 the	 objective-like	 aspects	 of	
moral	experience.21	On	the	one	hand	CE	(Horgan	and	Timmons	2008)	obvi-
ously	rejects	 the	strong,	ontological	notion	of	objectivity	referring	 to	some	












































(2)	 becoming	 (or	 being)	 so	 ought-committed	 because	 of	 certain	 objective	
non-moral	but	normatively	relevant	factual	considerations”	(2010:	121).
Here	we	 can	 see	 that	 in	 step	 (2)	Horgan	 and	Timmons	 speak	 about	 “nor-
matively	relevant”	considerations,	but	the	question	is	what	makes	them	such	
other	than	our	moral	attitudes	and	the	moral	outlook	that	we	happen	to	hold.25	





“The	 point	 of	 the	 image	 of	 projection	 is	 to	
explain	 certain	 seeming	 features	 of	 reality	
as	 reflections	of	 our	 subjective	 responses	 to	
a	 world	 which	 really	 contains	 no	 such	 fea-
tures.	Now	 this	 explanatory	direction	 seems	
to	require	a	corresponding	priority,	in	the	or-
der	 of	 understanding,	 between	 the	projected	
response	and	the	apparent	feature:	we	ought	








be	 susceptible	 to	 influence	 by	 higher-order	




























Horgan	 and	Timmons	 (2008)	 also	 point	 out	
that	one	can	defend	both	ontological	and	ra-
tionalist	objectivity	(e.g.	Mackie),	only	onto-
logical	 objectivity	 (e.g.	 McDowell)	 or	 only	
rationalist	objectivity	(e.g.	Hare,	Korsgaard).	
23
“First,	 direct	 moral	 experiences	 qua	 moral	
have	 to	 do	with	 taking	what	we	will	 rather	
vaguely	 call	 a	 ‘non-self-privileging’	 stance	
toward	one’s	action	and	circumstances.	Tak-
ing	 this	 sort	 of	 stance	 involves	 being	 open	
to	being	affected	by	desire-independent	con-
siderations	 that	 have	 largely	 to	 do	with	 not	
hurting	others.”	And	“in	coming	to	have	and	
experience	oneself	as	being	ought-committed	
to	 some	 course	 of	 action	 (or	 inaction),	 one	
experiences	 oneself	 as	 (1)	 becoming	 ought-
committed	in	a	non-self-privileging	way,	and	
(2)	as	becoming	so	committed	because	of	cer-
tain	 non-normative	 factual	 considerations”	
(Horgan	and	Timmons	2008).
24
One	 aspect	 of	 this	 argument	 could	 also	 be	
brought	up	by	an	argument	for	robust	moral	
realism	 that	 was	 just	 recently	made	 by	 En-
och	(2011),	i.e.	the	so-called	“argument	from	
moral	 consequences	 of	 objectivity”.	 As	 we	
understand	 Enoch,	 he	 is	 roughly	 claiming	
that	“truth	does	make	a	difference”.	 Is	mor-














“And	 so	 the	 nondescriptivist,	 rejecting	 the	
thesis	of	semantic	unity,	must	distinguish,	for	
moral	discourse,	between	surface features of 























4.1. The puzzle of moral phenomenology and prospects 
     for cognitivist expressivism
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analyses	 that	 essentially	 equated	 declarative	
moral	content	with	some	kind	of	non-cogni-
tive	 content	 expressible	 in	 nondeclarative	
language.	Eschewing	 descriptive	 declarative	
content	for	moral	thought	and	discourse,	the	
traditionalist	 embraced	 some	 form	 of	 non-
cognitivism	 (e.g.,	 emotivism)”	 (Horgan	 and	
Timmons	2002:	130)	It	seems	that	their	cog-
nitivist	 expressivism	 can	 avoid	 this	 duality	





A	 further	 way	 to	 weaken	 appeals	 to	 phe-
nomenological	 arguments	 is	 to	 claim	 that	
for	 example	 the	 debate	 on	 cognitivism	 and	






ing	 that	 in	“the	 light	of	a	 reasonable	skepti-
cism	 about	 folk	 psychology,	 the	 distinction	
between	 cognitivism	 and	 non-cognitivism	
must	 be	 once	 again	 re-conceptualized,	 or	
abandoned.”	 This	 means	 that	 “the	 concepts	






folk	 intuitions	 about	FP	concepts	 like	belief	
are	too	context-dependent	and	incomplete	to	
yield	 precise	 criteria	 to	 use	 in	 determining	
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Matjaž Potrč, Vojko Strahovnik
Fenomenološka objektivnost i moralna teorija
Sažetak
U članku se razmatra veza između moralne fenomenologije i moralne teorije. Ciljevi rada 
uključuju: razjasniti pojam moralne fenomenologije, posebice utjecaj koji je imala na moralnu 
teoriju; dati tumačenje rasprave između moralnog kognitivizma i nekognitivizma u svjetlu mo­
ralne fenomenologije; predstaviti najrecentniju poziciju kognitivnog ekspresivizma u vezi ove 
rasprave; ukazati na glavne nedostatke ove teorije, posebno po pitanju navodne objektivnosti 
moralnih iskaza. No kognitivni ekspresivizam i dalje ostavlja jaz između neposrednih značajki 
naše unutarnje moralne psihologije i njihovih teorijskih objašnjenja, gubeći tako većinu mogu­
će fenomenološke potpore. Konačno se predlaže odgovarajuće razumijevanje navodne fenome­




Matjaž Potrč, Vojko Strahovnik
Phänomenologische Objektivität und Moraltheorie
Zusammenfassung
Es wird die Relation zwischen Moralphänomenologie und Moraltheorie behandelt. Die Ziele 
dieser Abhandlung beziehen Folgendes ein: Klarstellung des Begriffs der Moralphänomenolo­
gie, insbesondere des Einflusses, den sie auf die Moraltheorie ausübt; Interpretation der Dis­
kussion zwischen dem moralischen Kognitivismus und Nichtkognitivismus im Lichte der Moral­
phänomenologie; Präsentation der jüngsten Position des kognitiven Expressivismus bezüglich 
dieser Debatte; Hindeuten auf die wichtigsten Unzulänglichkeiten dieser Theorie, vor allem 
in Bezug auf die vorgebliche Objektivität moralischer Urteile. Der kognitive Expressivismus 
hinterlässt jedoch eine Kluft zwischen den unmittelbaren Merkmalen unserer innerlichen Mo­
ralpsychologie und ihrer theoretischen Erklärung, wodurch ein Großteil seiner potenziellen 
phänomenologischen Unterstützung verloren geht. Vorgeschlagen wird ein angemessenes Ver­
ständnis der angeblichen phänomenologischen Objektivität zusammen mit deren Konsequenzen 
für die Moraltheorie.
Schlüsselwörter
Moralphänomenologie,	 Moraltheorie,	 Objektivität,	 Kognitivismus,	 Nichtkognitivismus,	 kognitiver	
Expressivismus,	Glaube,	Wahrheit,	moralischer	Realismus
Matjaž Potrč, Vojko Strahovnik
Phnénoménologie objective et théorie morale
Résumé
Cette article considère la relation entre la morale phénoménologique et la morale théorique. Les 
objectifs de ce travail sont les suivants : éclaircir le concept de la morale phénoménologique, en 
particulier l’influence qu’elle a eu sur la morale théorique; interpréter les discussions entre le 
cognitivisme morale et le non-cognitivisme à la lumière de la phénoménologie morale ; présen­
ter la position la plus récente de l’expressivisme cognitif en lien avec ce débat ; indiquer les prin­
cipaux défauts de cette théorie, principalement en ce qui concerne la prétendue objectivité des 
jugements moraux. En effet, l’expressivisme cognitif creuse encore un fossé entre les caractéris­
tiques immédiates de notre psychologie morale intérieure et ses explication théoriques, perdant 
ainsi la majeure partie du soutien phénoménologique apparent. Finalement, une compréhension 
adéquate de la prétendue objectivité phénoménologique est proposé avec la théorie morale.
Mots-clés
phénoménologie	morale,	théorie	morale,	objectivité,	cognitivisme,	non-cognitivisme,	expressivisme,	
croyance,	vérité,	réalisme	morale
